EMINENT DOMAIN: OREGON SUPREME COURT HOLDS
AIRCRAFT NOISE NUISANCE SUFFICIENT FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL TAKING OF PRIVATE PROPERTY
INCREASED air traffic and use of jet aircraft have focused attention on
the problem of resulting damage to private property due to the
projection of noise and vibration.:
Property law concepts and
remedies normally applied to cases involving aircraft interference
with use of property have tended to produce confusion and arbitrary
distinctions. A particularly troublesome problem arises where a
private landowner attempts to recover under the eminent domain

theory against a governmental body responsible for the alleged harm
to the land. A significant new approach to this problem was taken
recently when the Oregon Supreme Court in Thornburg v. Port of
Portland2 resorted exclusively to the theory of nuisance, rather than
trespass, to establish the requisite constitutional "taking" in a suit

against a municipality.
Plaintiffs, owners of land adjacent to Portland International
Airport, brought an action against the Port of Portland for inverse
condemnation 3 alleging that noise and vibration from aircraft
flying over and near their property resulted in defendant's taking an
easement of flight. The trial court decided, as a matter of law, that
there could be a taking only by reason of flights directly over plain-

tiffs' property at heights of less than 500 feet,4 thereby limiting the
"See generally Harvey, Landowners' Rights in the Air Age: The Airport Dilemma,
56 MicH. L. REv. 1313 (1958); Morris, Jetport Showdown in Jersey, Saturday Evening
Post, Dec. 17, 1960, p. 29; Weibel, Problems of Federalism in the Air Age-Part I, 24
J. AIR L. & Comt. 127 (1957); Note, Airplane Noise: Problem in Tort Law and Federalism, 74 HARv. L. Rv. 1581 (1961).
2 376 P.2d 100 (Ore. 1962).
3 "Inverse condemnation" describes a cause of action against a governmental defendant to recover the value of property "taken" even though there has been no
formal exercise of the power of eminent domain by the taking agency. Id. at 101 n.1;
see also 22A WoRDs AND PHRASES 231 (perm. ed. 1958).
The action in Thornburg was based on the Oregon constitutional prohibition of
governmental taking of private property for public use without just compensation.
The applicable provision of OMa. CONsr. art. I, § 18, which is identical in language
to the fifth amendment of the Constitution of the United States, has been construed
to have the same meaning. Cereghino v. State, 370 P.2d 694 (Ore. 1962).
'As applicable to this case, 500 feet is the minimum safe altitude for aircraft flight
as prescribed by regulation, 14 C.F.R. § 60.17 (1962), and constitutes the floor of
navigable airspace. 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (24) (1958). Some cases indicate flights above
the minimum safe altitudes are beyond the landowner's objection. See Matson v.
United States, 171 F. Supp. 283 (Ct. Cl. 1959); Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash. 2d
400, 348 P.2d 664 (1960).
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jury to consideration of flights actually trespassing the airspace below
500 feet over plaintiffs' land. Limited in this manner, the jury
found that there had not been a requisite taking. In a four to three
decision the supreme court reversed and held that noise originating
outside this "owned" airspace could create a nuisance sufficient to
be a taking.5
At common law, a landowner was generally considered to have
unlimited ownership of the airspace above his land. 6 However, in
light of developments in the aviation industry, courts have modified
this common law rule with theories ranging from the "privilege of
flight" doctrine recognizing unlimited ownership subject to an easement of flight7 to the "actual use" theory limiting ownership to space
which is physically occupied.8 The most widely used theory gives
the landowner title to the airspace he is able to use or occupy in the
enjoyment of the surface of his land.9
In suits between private parties, as distinguished from suits
against the government, several concepts have been applied to the
problem of aircraft interference with the use of property. The
3The rationale of the majority involved the logical progression of finding that (1)
noise can be a nuisance (2) which can give rise to a property interest (an easement)
the law will protect (3) that can be taken by substantial interference with the use
of the surface (4) when the noise comes straight down from above one's land or (5)
when it comes from some direction other than the vertical. Thornburg v. Port of
Portland, 376 P.2d at 106 (Ore. 1962). This is the practical application of the test
suggested by the dissent in Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580, 587 (10th Cir. 1962).
OThis concept is called the "ad coelum" doctrine. See, e.g., Peabody v. United
States, 231 U.S. 530 (1913); Ackerman v. Ellis, 81 N.J.L. 1, 79 At. 883 (1911); Butler v.
Frontier Telephone Co., 186 N.Y. 486, 79 N.E. 716 (1906). But see Pickering v. Rudd,
4 Camp. 219, 220-21, 171 Eng. Rep. 70, 71 (1815). See generally PROSSIR, ToRTS § 13
(2d ed. 1955); Bouv6, Private Ownership of Airspace (pts. 1-2), 1 AIR L. REv.232, 376
(1930); Hackley, Trespassers in the Sky, 21 MINN. L. Rav. 773 (1937); Annot., 42 A.L.R.
945 (1926).
7Vanderslice
v. Shawn, 26 Del. Ch. 225, 27 A.2d 87 (1942); UNIFORM AERONAU7TCs
AcT §§ 3, 4; RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 194 (1934).
8 Hinman v. Pacific Air Transp., 84 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S.
654 (1937).
"E.g., Cory v. Physical Culture Hotel, Inc., 14 F. Supp. 977 (W.D.N.Y. 1936);
Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 41 F.2d 929 (N.D. Ohio 1930), modified, 55 F.2d
201 (6th Cir. 1932); Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 20 S.E.2d 245 (1942);
Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash. 2d 400, 348 P.2d 664 (1960). This "possible
effective possession" also seems to be the theory of United States v. Causby, 328 U.S.
256 (1946). See Weibel, Problems of Federalism in the Air Age-Part I, 24 J. AIR L.
& CoM. 127, 133-34 (1957). But see Rhyne, Airport Legislation and Court Decisions,
14 J. AIR L. & CoM. 289, 295 (1947).
In addition to the theories noted in the text, some courts suggest that minimum
altitudes of flight should determine the extent of airspace ownership. See, e.g.,
Burnham v. Beverly Airways, 311 Mass. 628, 42 N.E.2d 575 (1942); Maitland v. Twin
City Aviation Corp., 254 Wis. 541, 37 N.W.2d 74 (1949).
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trespass theory bases liability on the actual invasion of property
"owned," thereby making the definition of owned airspace determinant of the right to recover.' 0 An alternate theory of recovery
in suits between private parties proceeds on the basis of **nuisance.""
The nuisance theory might properly be thought of as a logical
supplement to an action in trespass where the latter presents difficulties in applying the formal trespass elements. This involves the
abandonment of the cornerstone of trespass, physical intrusion into
private property, and the basing of liability on unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the surface.' - Most courts
faced with alternative theories of recovery find it unnecessary to pass
upon the trespass allegation and decide the liability issue solely in
terms of nuisance.' 3 The few courts which have retained the trespass
vocabulary have, in effect, adopted a nuisance standard to determine
4
commission of a trespass.1
However, litigation between private parties has become less important in recent years due to concentration of airport ownership
and air traffic regulation in federal, state, and local agencies. Instead,
inverse condemnation actions' 5 against governmental bodies for constitutional taking of private property have become paramount. 16 To
fit aircraft cases into the "eminent domain" concept, courts talk in
10 See, e.g., Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1932); Capitol
Airways, Inc. v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 215 Ind. 462, 18 N.E.2d 776 (1939);
Burnham v. Beverly Airways, 311 Mass. 628, 42 N.E.2d 575 (1942). Injunctive relief
may be proper under the doctrine of continuing trespass. See Hyde v. Somerset Air
Serv., Inc., 1 N.J. Super. 346, 61 A.2d 645 (1948); Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 310, 379 (1958).
"IE.g., Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1932); Vanderslice
v. Shawn, 26 Del. Ch. 225, 27 A.2d 87 (1942); Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514,
173 S.F. 817 (1934). The normal remedy for nuisance is injunctive relief, Atkinson v.
Bernard, Inc., 223 Ore. 624, 355 P.2d 229 (1960); Maitland v. Twin City Aviation Corp.,
254 Wis. 541, 37 N.W.2d 74 (1949); Annot., 140 A.L.R. 1362-69 (1942), but an injunction
may be denied altogether where damages would be sufficient. Antonik v. Chamberlain,
81 Ohio App. 465, 78 N.E.2d 752 (1947).
22See
Mace, Ownership of Airspace, 17 U. CINc. L. Rlv. 343, 361, 367 (1948); 35
ORE. L. REv. 296, 299 (1956).
13 E.g., Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 869, 20 S.E.2d 245, 249 (1942);

Hyde v. Somerset Air Serv., Inc., 1 N.J. Super. 346, 351-52, 61 A.2d 645, 647-48 (1948).
1' See, e.g., Cheskov v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash. 2d 416, 421-24. 348 P.2d 673. 676-78
(1960); Antonik v. Chamberlain, 81 Ohio App. 465, 78 N.E.2d 752 (1947); Note, 74
HARv. L. RaV. 1581, 1583 (1961).

See note 3 supra.
21 Both municipal and federal governments may be liable under the Constitution of
the United States. Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); see generally Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 1355-66 (1961). It is
the actual flight of aircraft which constitutes the taking, not statutory pre-emption as
navigable airspace. See Griggs v. Allegheny County, supra at 89-90. 30 FORDH.Ai L.
REv. 803, 808 (1962).
'r
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terms of flight easements that are valued by determining the difference in market value of the surface of the land before and after the
taking of such easement. 17 This, in effect, recognizes the impropriety of injunctive relief and limits recovery to money damages,
while circumventing the doctrine of "sovereign immunity" which
bars actions in trespass and nuisance against governmental bodies.
The problem in these inverse condemnation cases is thus one of
determining when aircraft noise and vibration can amount to a
taking. The strict concept of taking envisions actual seizure or
permanent ejection of the owner from his property by a physical
entry or interference depriving him of all beneficial use of the land.18
However, the modern view holds that any substantial interference
with private property by a governmental body if accompanied with
trespass is a taking to the extent of damages suffered even though
title and possession is undisturbed. 19 The degree of interference
necessary is a question of fact to be determined by the circumstances
of the case, but it seems clear that trespassory interference actionable
at common law is a taking.20 On the other hand, non-trespassory
interference though substantial is not a taking unless it deprives the
owner of 'all beneficial use of the land.21 The latter distinction
creates a class of noncompensable "consequential damage" cases
resulting from acts done in the proper exercise of governmental
powers and not directly trespassing upon nor peculiarly affecting
private property, though the consequences may be an actual impairment of its use. 22 These consequential damages are considered the
1'7See United States v. Causby, supra note 16; Matson v. United States, 171
F. Supp. 283 (Ct. CL. 1959); Highland Park, Inc., v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 597
(Ct. Cl. 1958). An easement is a property interest the law will protect. See NICHOLS,
EMINENT DOMAIN § 5.72 (3d ed. 1950) [hereinafter cited as NICHOLS]. For the solution
to the problem of when taking occurs and the running of the statute of limitations see
Bacon v. United States, 295 F.2d 936 (Ct. Cl. 1961); Davis v. United States, 295 F.2d 931
(Ct. Cl. 1961); Herring v. United States, 162 F. Supp. 769 (Ct. Cl. 1958); Highland
Park, Inc. v. United States, supra.
18 2 NICHOLS §§ 6.2, 6.22.
"'E.g., United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745 (1947); United States v. Causby,
328 U.S. 256 (1946); Levene v. City of Salem, 191 Ore. 182, 229 P.2d 255 (1951);
Moeller v. Multnomah County, 218 Ore. 413, 345 P.2d 813 (1959). Compare 2 NicHOtS
§ 6.3 with id. §§ 6.1[1], 6.38, 6.38[1].
20 United States v. Dickinson, supra note 19; 2 NIcHoL § 6.1[1].
21 United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945); Transportation Co. v.
Chicago, 99 U.S. 635 (1878); Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962);
Bartholomae Corp. v. United States, 253 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1957); Moeller v. Multnomah
County,
218 Ore. 413, 345 P.2d 813 (1959); 2 NICHOLS §§ 6.1[1], 6.38.
22
E.g., United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945); Richards v.
Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914); Transportation Co. v. Chicago,
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proper sharing of the common burden of incidental damages arising
from a legalized nuisance. 2s
Since an actual entry upon the land is of prime importance except in the single instance where the landlowner is deprived of all
beneficial use of this property, all courts have found it necessary
to find a physical trespass upon the airspace owned coupled with
substantial interference with the use and enjoyment of the surface
of the property before allowing recovery under inverse condemnadon. In United States v. Causby,24 the leading federal case of inverse condemnation involving aircraft, the Supreme Court held that
continuous invasion of airspace by low flying aircraft so as to substantially interfere with the use of the surface of the land itself is a
constitutional taking of an easement of flight. The Court's analysis
of the problem assumed private ownership of at least as much airspace as the owner can occupy or use. Though the test applied to
define owned airspace was a nuisance standard, it is clear the decision
was posited on the existence of both physical invasion and substantial
damage.The lower federal courts have followed the Causby case, being
supra note 21; Nunnally v. United States, 239 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1956); Pope v. United
States, 173 F. Supp. 36 (N.D. Tex. 1959); Freeman v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 541
(WD. Okla. 1958); see Moeller v. Multnomah County, supra note 21.
2BRichards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914); Batten v. United States,
306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962); Moore v. United States, 185 F. Supp. 399 (N.D. Tex.
1960).
24 328 U.S. 256 (1946), 14 J. Am L. & Com. 112 (1947). The basic rationale of Causby
had been developed previously in Portsmouth Harbor Land 8: Hotel Co. v. United
States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922) (coastal guns fired over land).
2"United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 262 n.7, 265-66 (1946). Owned airspace extended upward to such altitude that continuous flights through it would be unreasonable interference with the surface use-a nuisance standard. Id. at 264-65; cf. Harvey,
supra note 1, at 1316-17. However, once defined, the Court noted that it is the character of the invasion, not the amount of damage resulting from it, so long as the
damage is substantial, that determines whether it is a taking. United States v. Causby,
supra at 265-66. Thus, the requisite taking hinges on the existence of two elementssubstantial damage and the character of the invasion-except in the single instance,
not applicable here, where all beneficial use is taken from the owner. Id. at 261-62.
As to the character of the invasion, the only possible alternatives are physical and
non-physical-the classical distinction between trespass and nuisance. It is clear the
Court was thinking in terms of physical invasion. Id. at 262 n.7. Therefore, it seems
that Causby not only embraced a trespass requirement but also positively rejected
taking solely on the basis of nuisance. The practical effect would be that a landowner could recover on a pure nuisance theory only for flights directly over his property; a result accomplished by defining the upward limit of "owned airspace" by a
nuisance standard, i.e., substantial interference with the surface use. Causby would,
liowever, maintain the distinction between damages and taking where the noise was
projected from outside the boundaries horizontally.
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careful to use "actual intrusion on private property" to distinguish
between a requisite "taking" and noncompensable "consequential

damages."20

Matson v. United States2 7 found a taking of a flight

easement for flights over plaintiff's property at eighty five feet but

indicated that, under the Causby decision, flights above the 500 foot
regulated ceiling are "beyond the reach of the landowner's objection
to interference with his property rights. '28 More recently, the Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Batten v. United States, 2 a case
almost identical factually to Thornburg, found that there had been

a substantial interference with plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of their
land, but over a vigorous dissent of the Chief Judge held there was
no constitutional taking because there had been no physical invasion of owned airspace. 30 The result of the federal cases is a
settled requirement of trespass for recovery in inverse condemnation
actions.
. Whether the trespass requirement is a valid criteria for
limiting

recovery largely depends on policy considerations.

In disputes be-

tween private litigants the use of nuisance rather than trespass seems
26 Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962); Nunnally v. United States,
239 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1956); Pope v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 36 (N.D. Tex. 1959);
Freeman v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Okla. 1958).
27 171 F. Supp. 283 (Ct. Cl. 1959). This decision takes on added significance since
it was written by a member of the Court participating in the Causby decision-Mr.
Justice Reed-sitting by designation in the Court of Claims.
21Id. at 286. In fact, Causby only held that glide path for take-off and landing
were not in the navigable airspace under the then existing statutes, United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. at 263-64, and expressly indicated the decision did not pertain to the
status of navigable airspace. Id. at 263. However, Congress has redefined navigable
airspace to include glide path for take-off and landing, 72 Stat. 737, 739, 49 U.S.C.
§ 1301 (24) (1958), as well as minimum safe altitudes prescribed by regulations. See
14 C.F.R. § 60.17 (1956). Since Causby defined owned airspace in terms of substantial
interference with the surface use, it would be an anomalous situation if Congress
could appropriate this airspace without compensation by the mere designation of
"navigable airspace." Consistency requires that such classification be an immaterial
factor in detemining a taking, except to the extent that courts might presume minimum
safe altitudes to be reasonable. See Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, 87-88
(1962), 30 FORDHAM L. RaV. 803 (1962); 376 P.2d at 111-12 (dissenting opinion); Acker-

man v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash. 2d 400, 348 P.2d 664 (1960); see also Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Village of Cedarhurst, 238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956) (reasonable flight below
500 feet).
2 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962).
30 Apparently all jurisdictions follow the federal line of cases noted without significant modification. The dissenting judge in Thornburg pointed out that there are
no jurisdictions, state or federal, construing the same constitutional provision, which
rely solely on the law of nuisance in eminent domain cases. 376 P.2d at 111. The
majority did not dispute this point, but instead applied the principle of reasonableness
embodied in Causby while rejecting its limited scope of applicability resulting from
the trespass requirement. Id. at 107.
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more appropriate in solving aircraft interference cases in that the
nuisance analysis can be better used to weigh the conflicting interests of plaintiff, defendant, and public while trespass recognizes the
interest of the landowner only when there is physical invasion of
the property.3 ' While in suits between private parties the nuisance
approach may produce more equitable results due to its flexibility
and methodology, when the defendant is a governmental body there
is the further consideration of the concept of dual ownership of
property which vests in a sovereign the right to impose a "legalized
nuisance" on private property without liability for damage. 32 This
concept is based on settled public policy of encouraging government
initiated improvements without inordinate expense.3 3 Since it is
necessary to distinguish between damages and taking, the method
adopted has been to place an objective limitation in the form of
actual trespass into owned property plus substantial damage.
Notwithstanding these policy considerations and the settled
eminent domain concept applied by most courts, Thornburg takes
a new approach by using a nuisance theory exclusively to support
a requisite taking and unequivocally rejecting trespass as an essential
element for recovery. 34 There is no doubt that the approach adopted
in Thornburg and the Batten dissent is distinct from the federal rule
requiring trespass as essential to taking and has the result of eliminating the difference between "consequential damages" and
"taking." Thornburg,in effect, gives landowners a remedy, without
supporting legislation, for damages against governmental bodies
where interference is substantial enough to support a common law
nuisance suit. The court's main objection to the requirement of
trespass seems to be its arbitrary allowance or disallowance of recovery in cases involving a substantial identity in the degree of
property interference. For example, under the trespass theory,
recovery is allowed for flights at 499 feet but refused for flights at
81 See Keeton, Trespass, Nuisance, and Strict Liability, 59 COLUmN. L. RIv. 457,
464-70 (1959).
32 See cases cited note 21 supra;2 NicnoLs § 6.38[1).
33 See 376 P.2d at 114 (dissenting opinion); see also 2 NicuoLs § 6.3 8[1].
", The court had at least two alternatives. First, it could have insisted that plaintiffs
bring their action in nuisance under the doctrine of Wilson v. City of Portland, 153
Ore. 679, 58 P.2d 257 (1936). See 376 P.2d at 116 (dissenting opinion). Second, the
Thornburg case could have been decided within the bounds of established eminent
domain concepts by holding the projection of noise onto property to be a trespass
within the broad language of Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 221 Ore. 86, 342 P.2d
790 (1959).
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501 feet; allowed for noise projected straight down but refused when
the noise is projected from outside the "owner" airspace." Though
such arbitrariness is undesirable, the question remains whether it is
of sufficient moment, when measured against the cost to the public,
to vastly increase the concept of constitutional taking to include
governmental liability for damages generally considered a sovereign
property right.
Any conclusion must take into account the fact that the test
applied in Thornburg would turn the nationwide aircraft problem
over to the jury with nothing more than a "fair and just" standard
to be applied against an impersonal governmental body.80 Due to
the superiority of constitutions over legislation, once the Thornburg
doctrine is established as a constitutional test to determine when a
taking has occurred, it will normally be outside the legislative power
to change it. Any adjustment that may later become necessary to
protect the public interest would have to be accomplished by
cumbersome constitutional amendment procedure or by the judiciary.37 On the other hand, the legislature is not constitutionally prohibited from providing for "fair and just" compensation for "nontaking" damages suffered by property owners if such a course is in
the public interest. In view of these considerations, it would seem
8 376 P.2d at 109.
"6 d. at 107; Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580, 587 (10th Cir. 1962). It is

significant to note that Congress rejected trial by jury in suits against the government

in the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1958). Of major concern in the area
of eminent domain should be the unpredictability of jury application of a non-objective
"fair and just" standard. Though Causby removed part of the traditional objectivity

by defining the upward reaches of owned airspace in terms of nuisance, a municipality
could still reasonably estimate the cost of flight easements consisting of standard glide

paths for take-off and landing. However, under Thornburg, not only would the cost
be unpredictable but the almost total non-objectivity of the standard would increase
litigation. Also inherent in consistent application of the Thornburg rule is the
problem that any new aircraft producing more noise than its predecessors would aut6matically extend the horizontal taking zone-no small problem when contemplating
developments in the rocket field.
37 Causby may well be developing into a good illustration of judicial modification
of a broad rule. Indications are already appearing that some courts consider the

Causby rule defining "owned airspace" as going too far. The trend in lower federal
courts seems to be toward viewing Causby as holding flights above the regulation minimum safe altitudes beyond the reach of landowners' objection. See Matson v. United
States, 171 F. Supp. 283 (Ct. Cl. 1959), see note 26 supra. At least one state court views
the regulation minimum safe altitudes as conclusively reasonable. Ackerman v. Port
of Seattle, 55 Wash. 2d 400, 348 P.2d 664 (1960); see 376 P.2d at 111-12 (dissenting
opinion).
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that the fears expressed by the dissenting judge in Causby as to the
utility of "eminent domain" in meeting the problems of the air age
would be even more pertinent to the Thornburg extension of the
Causby principle. 38
"United States v. Causby, 338 U.S. 256, 268-75 (1946) (dissenting opinion). It is
not intended to imply that landowners should not be compensated for diminution of
property value caused by interference amounting to a common law nuisance. It is
proposed, however, that "eminent domain" is not the place to pigeonhole the problem.

